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interested and instrumentally rational. This deemphasizes the ability of Lockean
persons to recognize and be moved by the natural law, and so by rights claims
originating in the moral equality and independence of each. Levine is not
mistaken about the Hobbesian elements in Locke, but, by downplaying differ-
ences, he makes Locke’s political theory seem not only more Hobbesian but
also more coherent and less open to charges of inconsistency or contradiction
than in fact it may be. This is a general concern to keep in mind, and to mark
for students, when reading the essays.
A particularly welcome feature of these essays is Levine’s readiness to use
the insights of one author to suggest remedies for potential failings in another.
He thus draws enlightening connections between the views of apparent oppo-
nents and helps us to see that elements seemingly essential to a view may in
fact be modified or discarded without violence to its spirit. Valuable in this
regard is the appendix to chapter 4 (on Mill) considering Marcuse’s “Repressive
Tolerance.” On Levine’s reading, Marcuse here advocates limits on free speech
that are based on essentially Millian convictions. Although he shares much with
Mill, says Levine, Marcuse advocates these seemingly anti-Millian limitations be-
cause he is concerned with the highly imperfect world in which we live rather
than the ideal circumstances Mill assumed (a marketplace of ideas with free
entry and exit and consumers who are fully competent judges). Similarly note-
worthy is Levine’s advocacy of liberal supplementation of Marx and Rousseau.
This is essential, he suggests, to guard against state tyranny in any progress toward
the ideals they envision.
In sum, Levine’s collection would be a fine supplement to an advanced
survey course in modern political philosophy. It would also provide particularly
valuable insights for nonspecialists preparing to teach such a course.
Sarah W. Holtman
University of Minnesota
Midgley, Mary. Science and Poetry.
New York: Routledge, 2001. Pp. ix230. $35.00 (cloth); $14.95 (paper).
Like her earlier books, Mary Midgley’s Science and Poetry takes on Big Issues with
panache, style, and wit. Her many admirers find her that rare philosopher whose
writings not only bear on what matters to them but whose writings contain a
minimum of jargon. Her detractors—especially sociobiologists—find her writ-
ings hectoring and antiscience. That she sometimes comes across as a scold
seems undeniable. That she is antiscience, however, misses the mark: she is not
antiscience, but antiscientism. That is, she opposes the vaulting ambition of
science to be omnicompetent, the only arbiter of what is reasonable and rational,
that which philosophy and poetry should humbly celebrate.
Science and Poetry is a sprawling book. Not everything in it will seem of
immediate interest to some readers of this journal, but it does hang together
in a loose, discursive way, so that no one is likely to regret having taken the
entire journey with Midgley. True, those looking for tight, analytic arguments
set down in a highly organized, progressive way will find the book annoying,
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but Midgley’s book is a good reminder that there is more than one way of doing
good philosophy.
Midgley’s central thesis is that detailed thought depends logically, episte-
mologically, causally, morally, and inspirationally on entirely nondetailed visions:
“Every thought system has at its core a guiding myth—not a myth in the sense
of a lie but of an imaginative vision, a picture which does indeed ‘express its
appeal to the deepest needs of our nature’” (p. 200; quoting E. O. Wilson). She
tries to understand how such imaginative visions work and, more particularly,
“to grasp the part which atomistic [and Cartesian] visions have played in shaping
our own culture” (p. 7). Thus the title of her book.
Midgley has a keen eye for myths, metaphors, turns of phrase, and evocative
terms. Why, for example, are nonscientists often described as “laymen”? Doesn’t
that suggest that scientists are priests, and that those of us who aren’t scientists
should show the kind of deference and obedience due priests? And, she points
out, many suffer from “physics-envy,” which has as bad effects on our general
understanding of rational inquiry as the other kind of envy has on the relations
between the sexes.
Half of Midgley’s work is, therefore, destructive: to show how the atomistic
and Cartesian vision—both of which were proper for their times—now distort
our understanding of the world, including especially our moral and cultural
world. The Epicureans, for example, wished to displace religion with atomistic
science—and thereby make everyone happier. Now if religion is narrowly enough
understood as consisting entirely of “mindless anxiety, bad cosmology, and hu-
man sacrifice” (p. 31), this imaginative vision can liberate us. So, too, with
Descartes’s split of mind from body. This also liberated the new science from
the dead hand of scholasticism while, at the same time, insulating freedom,
responsibility, morality, and religion from a thoroughly mechanistic understand-
ing of the world.
As imaginative visions suitable to their time and problems, these two deserve
our appreciation. But what so often happens is that we lose sight of their met-
aphorical, mythical, and poetic status and begin treating them as ‘fact’, as the
way the world is. And this leads to myopia and distortion that has a direct effect
on our understanding of freedom and responsibility. As in her The Ethical Primate:
Humans, Freedom, and Morality (London: Routledge, 1994), Midgley argues that
the challenge to moral freedom and responsibility doesn’t come from deter-
minism—which she thinks is muddled anyway—but from fatalism, the view that
we are passive victims since “it is all in our genes”—or some other scientistic
view, for example, behaviorism.
Even the renewed interest in consciousness reflects deep (and deeply
flawed) fatalistic commitments. Suppose consciousness is epiphenomenal. In
that case it isn’t continuous with our natural evolutionary history and leads to
fatalism because what goes on in consciousness doesn’t matter. Alternatively,
suppose consciousness is some kind of “extra ingredient” (David Chalmers) that
needs to be accounted for “scientifically.” In that case, it appears that we must
hand over consciousness to physicists, chemists, and cognitive scientists.
I think Midgley is right to see either approach as a philosophical dead end
and right to suggest that we need to understand consciousness adverbially. The
difficulty, which recurs throughout the book, is that she doesn’t follow through
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with detailed arguments that would show, and not merely suggest, that this is
the proper way to understand consciousness.
A similar problem arises in her lengthy defense of the Gaia Hypothesis, or
the idea of life and the earth itself as a self-sustaining system. She describes it
alternatively as a “useful idea” (p. 172), “the idea of our planet as in some sense
a single organism” (p. 173, emphasis added), as a “myth, symbol” (p. 17), as “a
living organism under the physicist’s or the biochemist’s definition” (p. 204,
quoting James Lovelock), as functioning “in some way . . . as an organic whole”
(p. 181), yet “not to be taken literally” (p. 183). And Midgley insists on viewing
Gaia religiously, claiming that it (What? Earth as a living organism or as myth?)
engenders a religious response, since lying behind our personification of Gaia
(earth-goddess-like yet also organism-like) are sentiments of reverence, awe,
wonder, and gratitude. Certainly the natural world fills us with awe and wonder;
but reverence and gratitude? Should we stand in reverential awe as the lion
pounces on the wildebeest, the tumor invades the brain? Be grateful? Perhaps,
but Midgley never tells us exactly why—except that this imaginative vision coun-
teracts sociobiological and mechanistic visions.
First, however, I don’t think Midgley is simply evoking Gaia as an imaginative
vision, but as gospel: as something that she believes in as Christians believe in
God. She is coy about this, but the tone is unmistakable: the language of grate-
fulness, especially, presses the question: Grateful to whom? And here is where
Gaia as goddess really does supply a literal answer to that question. Second, that
we will do better science and understand ourselves better, morally and otherwise,
if we adopt a holistic perspective and not a reductive one seems absolutely
correct. But Midgley has written enough books with this theme without pro-
ducing the rigorous arguments needed to show its superiority, to show in detail
what is wrong with those who find themselves in deep disagreement with her.
It may not be Midgley’s particular gift to argue vigorously for her own imagi-
native, holistic perspective. Or perhaps she really does think that all we can do
is set imaginative visions against one another in the hope that those who aren’t
already committed will simply see the power of the ones she herself adopts.
Midgley is right that philosophy, generously understood, seeks connections.
She also understands that rigorous, analytic argumentation isn’t the only way
of doing philosophy, and it is admirable that she reminds us of that. It is another
thing, however, to push aside, as dismissively as she does, the need to complement
poetic imagination with detailed argument. This book—like so many of her
others—is a wonderful place to start; it is a less desirable place to finish.
Hans Oberdiek
Swarthmore College
Scho¨necker, Dieter, and Wood, Allen W. Kants “Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der
Sitten”: Ein einfu¨hrender Kommentar.
Paderborn: Verlag Ferdinand Scho¨ningh, 2002. Pp. 212. i9,90 (paper).
Libraries contain many shelves of books and articles devoted to the study of
Kant’s ethics. Yet, aside from a 1962 German translation of H. J. Paton’s The
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